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Tet Offensive Resources
The 1968Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue
During the 1968 Tet offensive an all-out effort by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces to overrun the major cities of South Vietnam. It marked the turning point of the Vietnam War. Although the attacks were costly failures in military terms, they set the United States on a path of disengagement from the war that ultimately led to the fall of Saigon some seven years later. The battles for the two northernmost provincial capitals in South Vietnam, Quang Tri City and Hue, are particularly worth examining because the enemy regarded them as key objectives, second only to Saigon, the national capital.
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Joint Chiefs of Staff and The War in Vietnam 1960–1968 Part 3 by Graham A. Cosmas
Part III of The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam, 1960–1968,
describes the formulation of policies and decisions during the years 1967–1968,
the period during which the United States military escalation in Southeast Asia
culminated. As it was written well before the war ended, the sources its authors
used were quite limited; for example, the Pentagon Papers were not then available.
Since that time, additional source material on all aspects of the war has become
available both in US official records and in histories produced by the other side
and made available in English. Using this new material, I have substantially revised
and in some cases expanded every chapter of the study, particularly those covering
the Tet Offensive and the US reaction to it.
Surprised at Tet: U.S. Naval Forces in Vietnam, 1968 by Glenn E. Helm
Originally published in Pull Together, the Newsletter of the Naval Historical Foundation and the Naval Historical Center, vol.36, no.1 (Spring/Summer 1997): 1-5.
Robert S. McNamara Resources
McNamara and Rumsfeld Control and Imbalance in Civil-Military Relations by Colonel Robert J. Rice
This Strategy Research Project is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the U.S. Army War College.
McNamara as a Transformative Leader by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew J. Lippert
This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic
Studies Degree at the U.S. Army War College. This SRP analyzes the reaction of a group of senior Army Officers to Robert S. McNamara as a transformative Secretary of Defense from
1961 to 1968. It explores, in historical context, a recurring phenomenon that will
presumably take place again. It seeks to shed light on how environmental scanning,
decision making and the human dimension of strategic leadership can impact
Robert S. McNamara Papers -- A Finding Aid to the Collection in the Library of Congress
United States secretary of defense, president of the World Bank, and corporate executive. Correspondence, memoranda, organization records, subject files, speeches and writings, reports, conferences and meetings, background and research material, and other papers relating primarily to McNamara's private and public life following his service as secretary of defense, including his leadership of the World Bank, his role as counselor and adviser to various private corporations and nonprofit organizations and foundations, and his commentary on and advocacy for solutions to the critical domestic and foreign policy issues of the times.
Military History Sites
Air Force Historical Studies Division (AFHSD)
The AFHSD provides information, analysis and perspective to Air Force leaders and their staffs to support planning, policy development and decision making.
Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
The mission of the historical office is to collect, preserve, and present the history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in order to support Department of Defense leadership and inform the American public.
Naval History and Heritage Command
The Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), headed by the Director of Naval History, is an Echelon II command headquartered on the Washington Navy Yard, D.C. The NHHC serves as the Navy's institutional memory by preserving, acquiring, producing, and disseminating history and heritage products and resources through Navy historical, archival, museum, curatorial, art, and underwater archeological programs.
U.S. Army Center of Military History
The mission of CHM is to accurately collect, preserve, interpret, and express the Army's history and material culture to more broadly educate and develop our force, the military profession, and the nation.
United States Marine Corps History Division
History Division's (HD) primary task is to research and write the Marine Corps’ official history. HD also provides reference and research assistance; preserves personal experiences and observations through oral history interviews; and deploys field historians to record history in the making.
William C. Westmoreland Resources
February 9–28: Westmoreland's Augmentation Request
Various records from February 1968 relating to General Westmoreland's augmentation request.
Papers of William C. Westmoreland
Finding aid for the papers of General Westmoreland located at the U.S. Army Center of Military History
Strategic Reassessment in Vietnam: The Westmoreland "Alternate Strategy" of 1967-1968 by Colonel Charles F. Brower, IV
This essay examines the efforts of General William C. Westmoreland to stimulate a reassessment of American strategy in Vietnam during the years 1967 and 1968. It rests heavily on unpublished primary sources from the Lyndon B. Johnson
Library, including the National Security File, Meeting Notes Files, and the Westmoreland "Eyes Only" Message File.
Strategy Of Attrition: Why General Westmoreland Failed In 1967
General Westmoreland's strategy of attrition, in 1967, failed because it reduced security across the countryside, ostracized the people within South Vietnam, and did not affect the South Vietnamese communists. The purpose of this study is to examine the operational approach General Westmorland used in 1967 to win the war in South Vietnam. This paper examines Westmoreland's strategy of attrition by looking at the buildup of troops leading into 1967 and then their utilization during four historic accounts by division level units. Offensive operations during Operation Junction City, by Task Force Oregon, the 1st Infantry Division, and The Z Division provide evidence that support failure in 1967. The study concludes that even with a half million soldiers, Westmoreland did not have enough forces to conduct offensive operations and secure the countryside. Ultimately, the year of offensive operations concluded in disappointment by Westmoreland and his staff. The lofty goal to destroy large Viet Cong formations and headquarters did not occur, leaving doubt in the minds of military leaders questioning the predicted cleanup phase of operations in 1968. The result only left the realities of the struggle that culminated in three hundred thousand wounded, 150 billion dollars spent, and more than fifty-eight thousand American names etched into a granite memorial.
Army of the Republic of Viet Nam Resources
Arvn: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army
Publication Date: 2006
"In this first in-depth history of the ARVN from 1955 to 1975, Robert Brigham takes readers into the barracks and training centers to plumb the hearts and souls of these forgotten soldiers. Through his command of Vietnamese-language sources - diaries, memoirs, letters, oral interviews, and more - he explores the lives of ordinary men, focusing on troop morale and motivation within the context of traditional Vietnamese society and a regime that made impossible demands upon its soldiers." "Offering insights into ARVN veterans' lives as both soldiers and devout kinsmen, Brigham reveals what they thought about their American allies, their Communist enemies, and their own government. He describes the conscription policy that forced these men into the army for indefinite periods with a shameful lack of training and battlefield preparation and examines how soldiers felt about barracks life in provinces far from their homes. He also explores the cultural causes of the ARVN's estrangement from the government and describes key military engagements that defined the achievements, failures, and limitations of the ARVN as a fighting force. Along the way, he explodes some of the myths about ARVN soldiers' cowardice, corruption, and lack of patriotism that have made the ARVN the scapegoat for America's defeat." "Ultimately, as Brigham shows, without any real political commitment to a divided Vietnam or vision for the future, the ARVN retreated into a subnational culture that redefined the war's meaning: saving their families. His book gives us a fuller understanding not only of the Vietnam War but also of the problems associated with U.S. nation building through military intervention."
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