THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK
May 31–June 1, 1916

THE DISPATCHES
OF
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLICOE
AND
VICE-ADMIRAL SIR DAVID BEATTY

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in-Chief was 'reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port', a conjecture which was confirmed by subsequent events. Course was thereupon shaped for the distant British bases, which were reached without further incident on Friday, June 2. Fuel and ammunition were taken on board, and at 9.30 p.m. the same evening the Fleet was reported once more ready for action.

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NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION

In response to the suggestion an Index of Ships, Persons, and Fleet Squadrons and Flotillas has been added.

The diagram on pages 17 and 38 has been slightly altered in order to conform to the intentional vagueness of the dispatch.

The opportunity has been taken to correct a few verbal errors in the first edition.

C. S. T.

August 1916.

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THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK

MAY 31–JUNE 1, 1916

I. ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELLIICOE'S DISPATCH

Iron Duke,
24th June, 1916.

Sir,—Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31st May, 1916, to the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.

The ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions issued by me.1

In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31st May, the 1st and 2nd Battle-cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light-cruiser Squadrons, and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, 10th, and 13th Flotillas,2 supported by the 5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, steering to the southward

1 The times throughout are Greenwich mean time.
2 The German semi-official communication of June 5 alleges: 'The German High Sea forces pushed forward in order to engage portions of the British Fleet, which were repeatedly reported recently to be off the south coast of Norway.'—The Times, June 6.
3 Under the immediate command of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty.
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of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the 3rd Battle-cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light-cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas.\(^1\)

The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course steered by our advanced force during the first hour after commencing their action with the enemy battle-cruisers.\(^2\) This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our battle-cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets would never have been in contact.

The Battle-cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., and admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron\(^3\) under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous conditions, especially in regard to light, in a manner that was in keeping with the best traditions of the service.

[The enemy sighted]

The following extracts from the report of Sir David Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon the scene:

'At 2.20 p.m. reports were received from Galatea\(^4\) (Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O., under the immediate command of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe).

\(^1\) Vice-Admiral Beatty's Report states that he was 'steering to the northward to rejoin your [Sir John Jellicoe's] Flag' when the enemy's advent was signalled, his light-cruisers being disposed in a screen ahead from E to W.: the Galatea was on the eastern or starboard wing.'

\(^2\) The German semi-official communication locates the position at 'some 70 miles off the Skager Rok'. The Hamburger Fürstenblatt's semi-official 'explanation' defines it more closely as '70 nautical miles to south-west of the Skager Rak'.—The Times, June 28.

\(^3\) i.e. on an eastward course towards the enemy.

\(^4\) At 4.35\(^2\) [i.e. 4.41 p.m., G. T.] says the German semi-official account, 'four small cruisers of the Galloway class were sighted by our cruisers. The latter at once pursued the enemy, who ran away with all speed northwards.'
had come in at high speed, and was able to take station ahead of the battle-cruisers by the time we turned to ESE., the course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the Light-cruiser Squadrons was excellent, and of great value.

[Scouting by a seaplane]

From a report from *Galatea* at 2.25 p.m. it was evident that the enemy force was considerable, and not merely an isolated unit of light-cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered *Engadine* (Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson) to send up a seaplane and scout to NNE. This order was carried out very quickly, and by 3.30 p.m. a seaplane, with Flight Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as observer, was well under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in *Engadine* about 3.30 p.m. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy light-cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light-cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value.

1 Cf. the German version, p. 25, note 4.  2 Seaplane carrier.

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[Beatty begins the action]

At 3.30 p.m. I increased speed to 25 knots, and formed line of battle, the 2nd Battle-cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle-cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to ESE., slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The 5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing NNW., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us and the wind SE. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.

At 3.48 p.m. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered to the south-
ward, and subsequently the mean direction was SSE., the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.\(^1\)

\[The Queen Elizabeths come into action\]

\(^1\) At 4.8 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy’s fire now seemed to slacken. The

\(^1\) The German semi-official communication in the Hamburger Fremdenblatt offers a diagram of the situation at this point: (1) = Hipper’s cruisers, (2) = the British light-cruisers in their alleged northward flight, (3) = Beatty’s battle-cruisers:

The plan represents Hipper (1) as turning to meet Beatty. Cf. Map II. The semi-official ‘explanation’ states that on sighting Beatty (3) ‘our cruisers take a course towards the new opponent, this becoming a course towards the south’, at 5.20 p.m., i.e. 3.26 p.m., G. M. T.

\[A Destroyer Engagement\]

\(^1\) Eight destroyers\(^2\) of the 13th Flotilla, Nector (Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham), Nomad (Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield), Nicotor (Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta), Narborough (Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett), Pelican (Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie), Petard (Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson), Osburne (Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams), Nerissa (Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge), with Moorsom\(^4\) (Commander John C. Hodgson), and Morris\(^4\) (Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham), of 10th Flotilla, Turulent (Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart), and Termagant (Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake), of the 9th Flotilla, having been ordered to attack the enemy

\(^1\) Destroyers of the ‘L’ class, 965 tons, 29 knots, 4-inch armament.

\(^2\) A light cruiser, Oiketim type, 5,449 tons, 25 knots, 5-inch and lesser armament.

\(^3\) Details of these new vessels are not published.

\(^4\) Displacement 1,000 tons, 4-inch armament.
attack, fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, Nestor was badly hit and swung to starboard, Nicator altering course inside her to avoid collision, and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo. Nicator made good her escape, and subsequently rejoined the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. Nestor remained stopped, but was afloat when last seen.\(^1\) Moorsom also carried out an attack on the enemy’s battle fleet.

Petard, Nerissa, Turbulent, and Termagant also pressed home their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers, firing torpedoes after the engagement with enemy destroyers. Petard reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy’s line, while Nerissa states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty’s Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions. I propose to bring to your notice a recommendation of Commander Bingham and other Officers for some recognition of their conspicuous gallantry.

From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle-cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy’s rear ships, unfortunately at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-

\(^1\) Nestor eventually sank. Nomad also was lost.
eastward had become considerably reduced, and the outline of the ships very indistinct. 1

[The German Battle Fleet sighted]

' At 4.38 p.m. Southampton 2 (Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.) reported the enemy's Battle Fleet ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m. the enemy's Battle Fleet was sighted SE. Course was altered 16 points in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Battle Fleet. 3 The enemy battle-cruisers altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. Southampton, with the 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron, held on to the southward to observe. They closed to within

2 Of the notion between 3.48-4.43 p.m. the German 'explanation' states, 'Our cruisers have advanced to 13 kilometres from the English battle-cruisers and destroyers, which meanwhile have moved southwards, and open fire on southerly to south-easterly courses. In the course of this fight two English battle-cruisers [Queen Mary, Indefatigable] and a destroyer were sunk.'

3 A light cruiser, Chatham class, 5,400 tons, 25 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.

The German semi-official communication describes the situation as at 4.42 p.m.: 'Soon afterwards [after the Queen Elizabeth came into sight] the German main force entered the fight. The enemy at once turned to the north, and the five [sic] vessels of the Queen Elizabeth class followed the English battle-cruisers.' It misrepresents the object of Beatty's movement: 'At the greatest speed the enemy attempted to evade our extremely effective fire by assuming echelon formation, trying thereby on an easterly course to overtake our advanced end [of the line]. Our fleet followed at top speed the movements of the enemy. In the course of this phase of the fighting one cruiser of the Achilles or Shannon class and two destroyers were destroyed.' The Hamburger Fremdenblatt provides the following diagram of the turning

13,000 yards of the enemy Battle Fleet, and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. Southampton's reports were most valuable. The 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy battle-cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy Battle Fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, in Barham (Captain Arthur W. Craig), this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.

' At 4.57 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came under the fire of the leading

movement: (1)=Hipper, (2)=Beatty, (3)=5th Battle Squadron (Queen Elizabeths), (4)=German Battle Fleet:
ships of the enemy Battle Fleet.¹ Fearless² (Captain (D) Charles D. Roper), with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla, joined the battle-cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. Champion³ (Captain (D) James U. Farie), with 13th Flotilla, took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 p.m. the 1st and 3rd Light-cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.⁴

The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van at about 6 p.m.

¹ Evan-Thomas, in Beatty's rear on the southward course, would meet Beatty and Hipper when the course was changed to the north. He engaged the latter as he passed him on his port bow, and then, altering course 10 points, i.e. putting about, turned up astern of Beatty and engaged the German Battle Fleet on a parallel course to starboard. See note 4, infra.

² Light cruiser, Battleaxe class, 3,440 tons, 26 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.

³ Flotilla leader.

⁴ Beatty's formation was as follows:—

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Between 5 and 6 p.m. the action continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, and one of their battle-cruisers quit the line in a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal observation, and was corroborated by Princess Royal¹ (Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O.) and Tiger² (Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.). Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 p.m. Onslow³ (Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey) and Moresby⁴ (Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison), who had been detached to assist Enaudeine with the seaplane, rejoined the battle-cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of Lion⁴ (Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O.). At 5.10 p.m. Moresby, being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at a ship in their line. Eight minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the sixth ship in the line. Moresby then passed between the lines to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined Champion. In corroboration of this, Fearless reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 p.m., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam.

At 5.35 p.m. our course was NNE., and the

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¹ Battle-cruiser, 26,330 tons, 650 ft. long, 28½ knots, 13·5-inch and lesser armament.

² Battle-cruiser, 27,000 tons, 660 ft. long, 28½ knots, 13·5-inch and lesser armament.

³ Destroyer.

⁴ Beatty's Flagship. Same class as Princess Royal; see note 1 supra.
estimated position of the Battle Fleet was N. 10 W., so we gradually hauled to the north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his light-cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron. Possibly Zeppelins were present also.

[The Battle Fleet in sight]

'At 5.50 p.m. British cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading battleships of the Battle Fleet, bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to east, and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to you that the enemy battle-cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three of the enemy battle-cruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships of the Koenig class.'

1 The advanced squadron of the Battle Fleet, under Hood.
2 I.e. five miles distant to the north.
3 The semi-official 'explanation' in the Hamburger Fremdenblatt gives the following version of the situation described by Admiral Beatty, with an explanatory diagram:

"The five [sic] big ships of the Queen Elizabeth class have attached themselves to the enemy cruisers. The whole combined German fleet (1) is now steering northwards, and in face of its attack the enemy (2) immediately turns away to the north, and attempts at the highest speed to escape from our extremely effective fire, and at the same time, with an easterly course, and employing its speed, which is superior to that of our fleet as a whole, to pass (3) the head of our line, while the German Battleship Squadron in the rear of the line cannot

Meanwhile, there approaches from the north, presumably coming from Norwegian waters, the English main force, consisting of more than 20 battleships (4).'

The course of the German fleet is purposely drawn to suggest its valiant assault upon an overwhelmingly powerful enemy.
cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed with the light-cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The enemy's Battle Fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them and must have crossed the enemy's track. Damage then caused Onslow to stop.

'At 7.15 p.m. Defender (Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer), whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots, while on the disengaged side of the battle-cruisers, by a shell which damaged her fore-

See Map II. The position at 6 p.m. was as follows, approximately:—

![Map II](image)

1 Destroyer of the 'I' class, 762 tons, 27 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.

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most boiler, closed Onslow and took her in tow. Shells were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1 p.m. 1st June, when Onslow was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey, of Onslow, and Lieutenant-Commander L. R. Palmer, of Defender, for special recognition. Onslow was possibly the destroyer referred to by the Rear-Admiral Commanding 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron as follows:—

'Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition soon after 6 p.m. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again, and made straight for the Derfflinger to attack her.'

Proceedings of Battle Fleet and Third Cruiser Squadron

On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted, the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying cruiser and destroyer force, proceeded at full speed on a SE. by S. course to close the Battle-cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that elapsed before the arrival of the Battle Fleet on the scene the steaming qualities of the older battleships were

1 Battle-cruiser, 26,200 tons, 680 ft. long, 26½ knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.
severely tested. Great credit is due to the engineering departments for the manner in which they, as always, responded to the call, the whole Fleet maintaining a speed in excess of the trial speeds of some of the older vessels.

[Hood reinforces Beatty]

The Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., which was in advance of the Battle Fleet, was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. At 5.30 p.m. this squadron observed flashes of gunfire and heard the sound of guns to the south-westward. Rear-Admiral Hood sent the Chester (Captain Robert N. Lawson) to investigate, and this ship engaged three or four enemy light-cruisers at about 5.45 p.m. The engagement lasted for about twenty minutes, during which period Captain Lawson handled his vessel with great skill against heavy odds, and, although the ship suffered considerably in casualties, her fighting and steaming qualities were unimpaired, and at about 6.5 p.m. she rejoined the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron.

The Third Battle-cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-westward, and at 6.10 p.m. sighted our battle-cruisers, the squadron taking station ahead of the Lion at 6.21 p.m. in accordance with the orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle-cruiser Fleet. He reports as follows:

'I ordered them to take station ahead, which

1 Hood eventually took station ahead of Beatty in Lion.
hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light-cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack. Indomitable ¹ (Captain Francis W. Kennedy) reports that about this time one of the Derfflinger ² class fell out of the enemy’s line.¹

[The Battle Fleet arrives]

Meanwhile, at 5.45 p.m., the report of guns had become audible to me, and at 5.55 p.m. flashes were visible from ahead round to the starboard beam,² although in the mist no ships could be distinguished, and the position of the enemy’s battle fleet could not be determined. The difference in estimated position by ‘reckoning’ between Iron Duke ⁴ (Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B.) and Lion,⁵ which was inevitable under the circumstances, added to the uncertainty of the general situation.

Shortly after 5.55 p.m. some of the cruisers ahead, under Rear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.,

¹ Battle-cruiser, 17,250 tons, 330 ft. long, 26 knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.
² Battle-cruiser, 26,200 tons, 689 ft. long, 26½ knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.
³ Light cruiser, 5,220 tons, 26 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.
⁴ Light cruiser, of Falmouth class. See preceding note.
⁵ i.e. over an angle of 90° on the line of course.
⁶ Battleship, 25,000 tons, 645 ft. long, 22 knots, 13.5-inch and lesser armament. Admiral Jellicoe’s flagship.
⁷ Battle-cruiser, 26,350 tons, 690 ft. long, 25½ knots, 13.5-inch and lesser armament. Vice-Admiral Beatty’s flagship.
and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O., were seen to be in action, and reports received show that Defence,\(^1\) flagship (Captain Stanley V. Ellis), and Warrior\(^2\) (Captain Vincent B. Molteno), of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light-cruiser at this time. She was subsequently observed to sink.

At 6 p.m. Canterbury\(^3\) (Captain Percy M. R. Royds), which ship was in company with the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, had engaged enemy light-cruisers which were firing heavily on the torpedo-boat destroyer Shark\(^4\) (Commander Loftus W. Jones), Acasta\(^5\) (Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), and Christopher\(^6\) (Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr); as a result of this engagement the Shark was sunk.

At 6 p.m. vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle-cruisers, were sighted by Marlborough\(^6\) bearing before the starboard beam of the battle fleet.

At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle-cruiser Fleet, reported to me the position of the enemy battle-cruisers, and at 6.14 p.m. reported the position of the enemy battle fleet.

At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle-cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron,

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\(^1\) Armoured cruiser, 14,000 tons, 28 knots, 9.2-inch and lesser armament.

\(^2\) Armoured cruiser, 13,550 tons, 28 knots, 9.2-inch and lesser armament.

\(^3\) Light cruiser.

\(^4\) Destroyer, 'K' class, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.

\(^5\) Of same class as Shark.

\(^6\) Battleship, 25,000 tons, 24 knots, 13.5-inch and lesser armament.

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great care was necessary to ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels.

[The Battle Fleet deploys]

I formed the battle fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir David Beatty's report, and during deployment the fleets became engaged. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle-cruisers ahead of the battle fleet.

The divisions of the battle fleet were led by:

The Commander-in-Chief,

Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B.,

K.C.M.G.

Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerham, K.C.B.

Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt.,

K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.

Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, C.B.

Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.

Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.

At 6.16 p.m. Defence and Warrior were observed passing down between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy fire. Defence disappeared, and Warrior passed to the rear disabled.\(^3\)

It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his engagement with the enemy's light-cruisers and in his desire to complete their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy's heavy ships, owing to the mist, until he found

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\(^3\) Both were of Arbuthnot's Cruiser Squadron, and were lost.
himself in close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not known when Black Prince\(^1\) (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the same squadron, was sunk, but a wireless signal was received from her between 8 and 9 p.m.

The First Battle Squadron became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening fire at 6.17 p.m. on a battleship of the Kaiser\(^2\) class. The other Battle Squadrons, which had previously been firing at an enemy light cruiser, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on battleships of the Koenig class.\(^3\)

At 6.6 p.m. the Rear-Admiral Commanding Fifth Battle Squadron, then in company with the battle-cruisers, had sighted the starboard wing-division of the battle-fleet\(^4\) on the port bow of Barham,\(^5\) and the first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form ahead of the remainder of the battle-fleet, but on realizing the direction of deployment he was compelled to form astern, a manoeuvre which was well executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from the enemy battle-fleet.\(^6\)

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1. Armoured cruiser, 13,500 tons, 480 ft. long, 23 knots, 9.2-inch and lesser armament, of Arbuthtud's Squadron.
2. Battleship, 24,700 tons, 20\(\frac{1}{2}\) knots, 13-inch and lesser armament.
3. Battleship, 25,500 tons, 20\(\frac{1}{2}\) knots, 12-inch (1 14-inch) and lesser armament.
4. See Map II, 6 p.m.
5. Battleship, 27,500 tons, 25 knots, 15-inch and lesser armament.
6. On first sighted the Battle Fleet on his port (left) bow, Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas assumed that it would continue its then course, and by altering his own to starboard proposed to place his squadron ahead of it. In fact, the Battle Fleet altered course to eastward (see Map II, 6 p.m.) and compelled Evan-Thomas to fall in astern, so that soon after 7 o'clock Beatty's squadrons were

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An accident to Warspite's\(^1\) steering gear caused her helm to become jammed temporarily and took the ship in the direction of the enemy's line, during which time she was hit several times. Clever handling enabled Captain Edward M. Phillips to extricate his ship from a somewhat awkward situation.

Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy's battle line. Towards the van only some four or five ships were ever visible at once. More could be seen from the rear squadron, but never more than eight to twelve.\(^3\)

The action between the battle-fleets lasted intermittently from 6.17 p.m. to 8.20 p.m. at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards, during which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from SE. by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly turned away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and the alterations of course had the effect of bringing the British Fleet (which commenced the action in a position of advantage on the bow of the enemy) leading Jellicoe and Evan-Thomas on a common course. See diagram, p. 41.

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1. Battleship, Queen Elizabeth class. See note 5, p. 46.
2. i.e. of the rear squadron of von Scheer's retreating Battle Fleet.
3. When the British Battle Fleet came into action between 6-7 p.m., Beatty's heading-off movement sent the whole German Fleet about on a SW. course. Scheer's Battle Fleet would be in the rear of the procession, but at a distance and in climatic conditions that enabled it to escape a decisive encounter with Jellicoe's big ships, which were endeavouring to close, i.e. join action.
to a quarterly hearing from the enemy battle line, but at the same time placed us between the enemy and his bases.¹

At 6.55 p.m. Iron Duke passed the wreck of Invincible ² (Captain Arthur L. Gray), with Badger ³ (Commander C. A. Fremantle) standing by.

During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective fire kept up by the battleships and battle-cruisers of the Grand Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were seen to be constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the line and at least one to sink. The enemy’s return fire at this period was not effective, and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.

¹ See Map II: Scheer at 8.15, Jellicoe at 8.10 p.m. The German semi-official account cautiously says little of the battle from the moment that Scheer headed for home: ‘Soon afterwards fresh strong enemy forces appeared from the north, consisting, as was soon established, of more than 20 enemy battleships of the latest construction. As the head of our line temporarily came under fire from both sides [Beatty and Jellicoe] our line was turned round to a westerly course. Simultaneously torpedo-boat flotillas were sent against the enemy. They attacked with great spirit and visible success, three times running into this sector... The battle against superior British forces lasted until darkness fell.’ The Hamburger Fremdenblatt’s diagram and explanation are given infra, note 2, p. 52.

² Battle-cruiser, 17,350 tons, 55 knots, 28-knot battleship, 12-inch armament.

³ Destroyer, class ‘I’, 700 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.

SIR JOHN JELLICOE’S DISPATCH

The Battle-cruisers in the Van.

Sir David Beatty reports:

‘At 7.6 p.m. I received a signal from you that the course of the Fleet was south. Subsequently signals were received up to 8.45 p.m. showing that the course of the Battle Fleet was to the southwest.

‘Between 7 and 7.12 p.m. we hauled round gradually to SW. by S. to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 p.m. again sighted them at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were two battle-cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the Koenig class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward,¹ but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 p.m. and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 p.m. my course was SW., speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing NW. by W. Again, after a very short time, the enemy showed signs of punishment, one ship being on fire, while another appeared to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy’s line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they turned away, and at 7.45 p.m. we lost sight of them.

‘At 7.58 p.m. I ordered the First and Third Light-cruiser Squadrons to sweep to the westward and

¹ i.e. in the rear of the German fleet on its south-western course.
locate the head of the enemy’s line, and at 8.20 p.m. we altered course to west in support. 1 We soon located two battle-cruisers and battleships, and were heavily engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit repeatedly by Lion, and turned away eight points, emitting very high flames and with a heavy list to port. Princess Royal 2 set fire to a three-funnelled battleship. New Zealand 3 (Captain John F. E. Green) and Indomitable 4 report that the third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them, and Falmouth 5 reported they were last seen at 8.38 p.m. steaming to the westward.

At 8.40 p.m., all our battle-cruisers felt a heavy shock as if struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly

1 The situation at 8.20 p.m. is represented in the following diagram:

2 Battle-cruiser, 26,350 tons, 660 ft. long, 28½ knots, 13½-inch and lesser armament.
3 Battle cruiser, 18,800 tons, 555 ft. long, 26 knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.
4 Battle-cruiser, 17,250 tons, 530 ft., 26 knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.
5 Light cruiser, 6,250 tons, 25 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.

sunken wreckage. As, however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel.

I continued on a south-westerly course with my light cruisers spread until 9.24 p.m. Nothing further being sighted, I assumed that the enemy were to the north-westward, and that we had established ourselves well between him and his base. Minotaur 1 (Captain Arthur C. S. H. D’Aeth) was at this time bearing north 5 miles, and I asked her the position of the leading battle squadron of the Battle Fleet. Her reply was that it was not in sight, but was last seen bearing NNE. I kept you informed of my position, course, and speed, also of the bearing of the enemy.

In view of the gathering darkness, and the fact that our strategical position was such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favourable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to close the enemy Battle Fleet during the dark hours. I therefore concluded that I should be carrying out your wishes by turning to the course of the Fleet, reporting to you that I had done so.” 2

1 Armoured cruiser, 14,600 tons, 490 ft. long, 23 knots, 9.2-inch and lesser armament.
2 Beatty’s meaning is clear from Map II, Iron Duke 9 p.m., Lion 9.24 p.m. In a later paragraph, “Night Dispositions”, Jellicoe explains his reasons for the altered course to which Beatty conformed at 9.24 p.m. See infra, p. 57.
Details of Battle-Fleet Action

As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very much on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility and by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a 'following' or 'chasing' fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently fired, but only one took effect (on Marlborough), and even in this case the ship was able to remain in the line and to continue the action. The enemy's efforts to keep out of effective gun range were aided by the weather conditions, which were ideal for the purpose. Two separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.

1 Battleship, 25,000 tons, 645 ft. long, 22 knots, 13.6 inch and lesser armament.
2 The Hamburger Fremdenblatt gives the following diagram of the situation from the arrival of Jellicoe upon the scene. It is in fact wholly fictitious, and is intended to support the assertion that by an inferior German fleet the English Main Fleet is driven away to the east (see), whence it will afterwards have taken a north-westerly course homewards.'

Towards 10 o'clock (i.e. 8.8 p.m. Greenwich mean time) all the German ships (1) are together facing the whole English Fleet. At a distance of some 10 nautical miles the battle now pursues its course eastwards. While the English Cruiser Fleet (2) continues its attempts to catch up the head of our line, Admiral Jellicoe is striving to put himself with his large battleships (3) like the cross of a T in front of the head of our line. As the head of our line thus comes for a time under fire from both sides, Admiral Scheer throws the German line round on to a westerly course, and at the same time our torpedo-boat flotillas (marked with triangles in the sketch) are ordered to attack the enemy, and they do so three times in succession with splendid vigour and visible success. A number of the large English battleships suffer severe damage, and one sinks before our eyes. By these attacks the English Main Fleet is driven away to the east, whence it will afterwards have taken a north-westerly course homewards.'

Comparing the diagram with Map II it will be noticed that the German account deliberately falsifies the chart of the battle after the point marked 6.15 p.m. on Scheer's course in Map II.

1 i.e. broadsides.
at 7.12 p.m. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the *Koenig* class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective fire was kept up in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused by the torpedo was most creditable to the ship and a very fine example to the squadron.

The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000 yards. The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy's return fire than the remainder of the battle-fleet, with the exception of the Fifth Battle Squadron. *Colossus*¹ (Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound) was hit, but was not seriously damaged, and other ships were straddled with fair frequency.²

In the Fourth Battle Squadron—in which squadron my flagship *Iron Duke* was placed—Vice-Admiral Sir Doverton Sturdee leading one of the divisions—the enemy engaged was the squadron consisting of *Koenig* and *Kaiser* class³ and some of the battle-cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and light-cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter, but the fire of the squadron was effective. *Iron Duke*, having previously fired at a light-cruiser between the lines, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on a battle-cruiser of the *Koenig* class at a range of 12,000 yards. The latter was very quickly straddled, and hitting commenced at the second salvo and only ceased when the target

¹ Battleship, 20,000 tons, 520 ft. long, 21 knots, 12-inch and lesser armament.
² i.e. shots were falling on both sides of the ship, but not hitting her.
³ The battle-cruisers of the *Koenig* class are, or were, *Grosser Kurfürst*, *Kronprinz*, *Markgraf*; and of the *Kaiser* class, *Friedrich der Grosse*, *Prinzregent Luitpold*, *König Albert*, *Kaiserin*.

ship turned away. The rapidity with which hitting was established was most creditable to the excellent gunnery organization of the flagship, so ably commanded by my Flag-Captain, Captain Frederic C. Dreyer.

The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed at enemy battle-cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the mist. Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.

The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the *Kaiser* or *Koenig* classes between 6.30 and 7.20 p.m., and fired also at an enemy battle-cruiser which had dropped back apparently severely damaged.

During the action between the battle fleets the Second Cruiser Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O., with the addition of *Duke of Edinburgh*¹ (Captain Henry Blackett) of the First Cruiser Squadron, occupied a position at the van, and acted as a connecting link between the battle fleet and the battle-cruiser fleet. This squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not have an opportunity of coming into action.

The attached cruisers *Bouclierre*² (Captain Louis C. S. Woolcombe, M.V.O.), *Active*³ (Captain Percy Withers), *Blanche*⁴ (Captain John M. Casement),

¹ Armoured cruiser, 13,050 tons, 480 ft. long, 23 knots, 9-2-inch and lesser armament.
² Light cruiser, 3,330 tons, 26 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.
³ Light cruiser, 3,440 tons, 26 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.
⁴ Light cruiser, 3,390 tons, 26 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.
and Bellona ¹ (Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton) carried out their duties as repeating-ships ² with remarkable rapidity and accuracy under difficult conditions.

The Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to attack enemy destroyers at 7.20 p.m., and again at 8.18 p.m., when they supported the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under Commodore James R. P. Hawksley, M.V.O., to attack. On each occasion the Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore Le Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their object was attained, although with some loss in the second attack, when the ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet at between 6,500 and 8,000 yards. The Calliope ³ (Commodore Le Mesurier) was hit several times, but did not sustain serious damage, although I regret to say she had several casualties. The light-cruisers attacked the enemy’s battleships with torpedoes at this time, and an explosion on board a ship of the Kaiser class was seen at 8.40 p.m.

During these destroyer attacks four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers were sunk by the gun-fire of battleships, light-cruisers, and destroyers.

After the arrival of the British Battle Fleet the enemy’s tactics were of a nature generally to avoid further action, in which they were favoured by the conditions of visibility. ⁴

¹ Light cruiser, 3,300 tons, 26 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.
² I.e. repeating signals, clouded by smoke, etc., to ships astern of the flagship.
³ Flotilla leader.
⁴ Compare with this statement the German semi-official ‘explanation’.

Night dispositions.

At 9 p.m. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat of torpedo-boat-destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the night, quoted in note 2, p. 52. That narrative continues: ‘The German Fleet ceases its violent cannonade at 11.30 [9.36 p.m. G.M.T.], as the English had already stopped firing, and after nightfall there was nothing but the flash of their salvos to give us a target. As the enemy cannot be found again the main battle is broken off.’

The Hamburger Freundesblatt offers the following simple summary of the engagement:

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Area of Battle

O — Course of German Fleet’s Advance

— Course of British Fleet’s Retreat

The eastward bearing of the arrow indicating ‘Course of Main Action’ will be noticed. See diagram in note 2, p. 52.
with a view to its safety from such attacks, whilst providing for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manoeuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack, and at the same time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy’s heavy ships.

Night Attacks by Flotillas.

During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked, but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore Hawksley and Captains Charles J. Wintour and Anselen J. B. Stirling, delivered a series of very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy losses.

It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth Flotilla occurred, including that of Tipperary, with the gallant leader of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his flotilla to a high pitch of perfection, and although suffering severely from the fire of the enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels was taken, and many gallant actions were performed by the flotilla.

Two torpedoes were seen to take effect on enemy vessels as the result of the attacks of the Fourth

Flotilla, one being from Spitfire (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny), and the other from either Ardent (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden), Ambuscade (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles), or Garland (Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff).

The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anselen J. B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked, which consisted of six large vessels, besides light-cruisers, and comprised vessels of the Kaiser class, was taken by surprise. A large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at the second and third ships in the line; those fired at the third ship took effect, and she was observed to blow up. A second attack, made twenty minutes later by Manad (Commander John P. Champion) on the five vessels still remaining, resulted in the fourth ship in the line being also hit.

The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light-cruisers on reaching the rear of the line, but the Onslaught (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.) was the only vessel which received any material injuries. In the Onslaught Sub-Lieutenant Harry W. A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot, R.N.R., the only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship successfully out of action and reached her home port.

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1 See diagram, p. 50.
2 The German semi-official ‘explanation’ asserts that these losses were inflicted upon vessels detailed by Jellicoe to cover the retreat of the English. It claims liberally ‘several’ cruisers and at least ten destroyers as sunk.
3 Flotilla leader.

1 Destroyer, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.
2 Destroyer, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.
3 Destroyer, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.
4 Destroyer, 944 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.
5 Destroyer. Details of construction not published.
6 Destroyer. Details of construction not published.
During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, Castor\(^1\) (Commodore James R. P. Hawksley), leading the flotilla, engaged and sank an enemy torpedo-boat-destroyer at point-blank range.

Sir David Beatty reports:—

‘The Thirteenth Flotilla, under the command of Captain James U. Farie, in Champion\(^2\), took station astern of the battle fleet for the night. At 0.30 a.m. on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to Pelard\(^3\) and Turbulent\(^4\), switched on searchlights and opened a heavy fire, which disabled Turbulent. At 3.30 a.m. Champion was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. Moresby\(^5\) reports four ships of Deutschland class sighted at 2.35 a.m., at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by Moresby and Obdurate.\(^6\)

‘Fearless\(^7\) and the 1st Flotilla were very usefully employed as a submarine screen during the earlier part of the 31st May. At 6.10 p.m., when joining the Battle Fleet, Fearless was unable to follow the battle cruisers without fouling the battleships, and therefore took station at the rear of the line. She sighted during the night a battleship of the Kaiser class steaming fast and entirely alone. She was not able to engage her, but believes she was attacked

SIR JOHN JELLINEK's DISPATCH

by destroyers further astern. A heavy explosion was observed astern not long after.\(^7\)

There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas; they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of them.

Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light-cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close action for about 15 minutes at 10.20 p.m. with a squadron comprising one enemy cruiser and four light-cruisers, during which period Southampt\(^1\) and Dublin\(^2\) (Captain Albert C. Scott) suffered rather heavy casualties, although their steaming and fighting qualities were not impaired. The return fire of the squadron appeared to be very effective.

Abdiel,\(^3\) ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out her duties with the success which has always characterized her work.

Proceedings on 1st June.

At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet, being then to the southward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in search of enemy vessels and for the purpose of collecting our own cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag from Marlborough to Revenge,\(^4\) as the former ship had some difficulty

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\(^1\) Light cruiser, 5,400 tons, 25 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.
\(^2\) Light cruiser, 5,400 tons, 25 knots, 6-inch and lesser armament.
\(^3\) Details not published.
\(^4\) Battleship, 25,700 (7) tons, 15-inch and lesser armament.

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\(^1\) Flotilla leader.
\(^2\) Flotilla leader.
\(^3\) Destroyer, 1,430 tons.
\(^4\) Destroyer. Details not published.
\(^5\) Destroyer. Details not published.
\(^6\) Destroyer, 3,440 tons, 26 knots, 4-inch and lesser armament.
in keeping up the speed of the squadron. Marlborough was detached by my direction to a base, successfully driving off an enemy submarine attack en route. The visibility early on 1st June (three to four miles) was less than on 31st May, and the torpedo-boat destroyers, being out of visual touch, did not rejoin until 9 a.m. The British Fleet remained in the proximity of the battle-field and near the line of approach to German ports until 11 a.m. on 1st June, in spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines and torpedo craft. The enemy, however, made no sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port. Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our position must have been known to the enemy, as at 4 a.m. the Fleet engaged a Zeppelin for about five minutes, during which time she had ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and course of the British Fleet.

The waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched, and some survivors from the destroyers Ardent 1 (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden), Fortune 2 (Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry, and Tipperary 3 (Captain (D) Charles J. Wintour), were picked up, and the Sparrowhawk 4 (Lieutenant-

1 Destroyer, 'K' class, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.
2 Destroyer, 'K' class, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.
3 Destroyer, 1,490 tons.
4 Destroyer, 'K' class, 935 tons, 30 knots, 4-inch armament.

SIR JOHN JELLICOE'S DISPATCH

Commander Sydney Hopkins), which had been in collision and was no longer seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and at 1.15 p.m., it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded in returning to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were reached without further incident on Friday, 2nd June. A cruiser squadron was detached to search for Warrior, which vessel had been abandoned whilst in tow of Engadine on her way to the base owing to bad weather setting in and the vessel becoming unserviceable, but no trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by a light-cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident that she foundered.

Sir David Beatty reports in regard to the Engadine as follows:

'The work of Engadine appears to have been most praiseworthy throughout, and of great value. Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson deserves great credit for the skilful and seamanlike manner in which he handled his ship. He actually towed Warrior for 75 miles between 8.40 p.m. 31st May, and 7.15 a.m., 1st June, and was instrumental in saving the lives of her ship’s company.’

I fully endorse his remarks.

The Fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30 p.m. on 2nd June was reported ready for further action.

1 Armoured cruiser, 13,500 tons, 480 ft. long, 23 knots, 9.2-inch and lesser armament.
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK

Losses

The conditions of low visibility under which the day action took place and the approach of darkness enhance the difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted or the names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most careful examination of the evidence of all officers, who testify to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of these officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure gives the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, especially those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels sunk, it is unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack.

I deeply regret to report the loss of H.M. ships.

1 The class and displacement of the lost ships are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Queen Mary</td>
<td>Battle-cruiser</td>
<td>27,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Indefatigable</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>18,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Invincible</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>17,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Defence</td>
<td>Armoured cruiser</td>
<td>14,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Black Prince</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>13,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Warrior</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>13,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Tipperary</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>1,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ardent</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Fortune</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Shark</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Sparrowhawk</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Nestor</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Nomad</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Turbulent</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
<td>1,430</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total, 118,300

SIR JOHN JELLICOE'S DISPATCH

Queen Mary
Indefatigable
Invincible
and of H.M.'s
Tipperary
Ardent
Fortune
Shark
Defence
Black Prince
Warrior
Sparrowhawk
Nestor
Nomad, and
Turbulent

and still more do I regret the resultant heavy loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arkwright, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hoon, Captain Charles F. Soreby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse, Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles J. Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They led officers and men who were equally gallant, and whose death is mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.

The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of him. We particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled German light-cruiser which passed down the British line shortly after deployment, under a heavy fire, which was returned by the only gun left in action.

[The Personnel of the Fleet]

The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night actions was entirely beyond praise.
No words of mine could do them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld—whether in heavy ships, cruisers, light-cruisers, or destroyers—the same admirable spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all.

I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the Fleet filled me.

Details of the work of the various ships during action have now been given. It must never be forgotten, however, that the prelude to action is the work of the engine-room department, and that during action the officers and men of that department perform their most important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course of the action gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations under review. Several ships attained speeds that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and several instances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of injured ships.

The artisan ratings also carried out much valuable work during and after the action; they could not have done better.
Fleet. They acted throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney’s squadron, owing to its position, was able to see more of the enemy Battle Fleet than the other battle squadrons, and under a leader who has rendered me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the squadron did excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir David Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action in rear of the Battle Fleet in the most judicious manner in the evening.

[Sir David Beatty]

Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He appreciated the situations at once on sighting first the enemy’s lighter forces, then his battle-cruisers, and finally his battle fleet. I can fully sympathize with his feelings when the evening mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for which he had manoeuvred, and for which the vessels in company with him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on two previous occasions, have been of the very greatest value.

Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant

1 A German attempt, on January 24, 1915, to raid the English coast was punished by Sir David Beatty, with the loss of a battle-cruiser to the enemy. On the preceding August 28, 1914, Beatty brought the Germans to an engagement in the Bight of Heligoland, which cost them at least three cruisers.

SIR JOHN JELLICOE’S DISPATCH

support afforded him by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; the magnificent manner in which Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood brought his squadron into action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, and the good work performed by the Light-cruiser Squadrons under the command respectively of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D.W. Napier, Commodore William E. Goodenough, and Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. He states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes and used their forces to the best possible effect.

I most fully endorse all his remarks, and I forward also the following extract from his report regarding the valuable services rendered by his staff:—

[The Staff]

1 I desire to record and bring to your notice the great assistance that I received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the Staff, Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, whose good judgement was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag-Commander, the Hon. Reginald A. R. Plunkett, was most valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the enemy’s discomfiture; my Secretary, Frank T. Spickernell, who made accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping the situation clearly before me; my Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Ralph F. Seymour, who maintained efficient
communications under the most difficult circumstances, despite the fact that his signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the manœuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the enemy's fire.'

I cannot close this dispatch without recording the brilliant work of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden, K.C.B., C.V.O. Throughout a period of 21 months of war his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgement, his long experience in fleets, special gift for organization, and his capacity for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest assistance to me, and have relieved me of much of the anxiety inseparable from the conduct of the Fleet during the war. In the stages leading up to the Fleet action and during and after the action he was always at hand to assist, and his judgement never at fault. I owe him more than I can say.

My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., the Captain of the Fleet, who also assists me in the working of the Fleet at sea, and to whose good organization is largely due the rapidity with which the Fleet was fuelled and replenished with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much assistance to me during the action.

Commander Charles M. Forbes, my Flag-Commander, and Commander Roger M. Bellairs, of my Staff, plotted the movements of the two Fleets with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received; Commander the Hon. Matthew R. Best, C.M.G., of my Staff, acted as observer aloft throughout the action, and his services were of value. These officers carried out their duties with much efficiency during the action.

The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Commander Alexander R. W. Woods, assisted by the other signal officers, and all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions. The signal departments in all ships deserve great credit for their work. My Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert, was also of much service to me throughout the action.

The high state of efficiency of the W/T arrangements of the fleet, and the facility with which they were worked before, during, and after the action, is a great testimony to the indefatigable work carried out by Commander Richard L. Nicholson. His services have been invaluable throughout the war.

A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all ships.

My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. Shake, C.B., and Victor H. T. Weeke, recorded with accuracy salient features of the action. Their records have been of much assistance.

To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. Leggatt, I am indebted for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning throughout the operations.

In a separate dispatch I propose to bring to the notice of their Lordships the names of officers and men all of whom did not come under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of specially distinguishing themselves.
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK

I append the full text of Sir David Beatty's report to me, from which, as will be seen, I have made copious extracts in order to make my narrative continuous and complete.1

I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
J. R. JELLI COE, Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief.

ENCLOSURE.

LIST OF ENEMY VESSELS PUT OUT OF ACTION,
31 MAY—1 JUNE, 1916 2

Battleships or Battle-cruisers.

2 Battleships, Dreadnought type.
1 Battleship, Deutschland type.
(Seen to sink.)

SIR JOHN JELLI COE'S DISPATCH

1 Battle-cruiser.
(Sunk—Lützow, admitted by Germans.)

1 Battleship, Dreadnought type.

1 Battle-cruiser.
(Seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely doubtful if they could reach port.)

LIGHT-CRUISERS.

5 Light-cruisers.
(Seen to sink; one of them had the appearance of being a larger type, and might have been a battleship.)

that the battle-cruiser Lützow and the cruiser RoscoH had also been destroyed, "military reasons" being pleaded in excuse for the policy of concealment. In short, from the first the enemy decided that the world should not know how seriously the High Seas Fleet had been handled and what grievous losses it had suffered.

According to the Commander-in-Chief, it may be accepted as certain that the enemy lost the following vessels, apart from the Seydlitz, which ran on the German coast almost a total wreck:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Displacement (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Battleships</td>
<td>Dreadnought type</td>
<td>47,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Battleship</td>
<td>Deutschland type</td>
<td>13,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Battle-cruiser</td>
<td>Lützow</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 RoscoHs (light-cruisers)</td>
<td>RoscoH</td>
<td>24,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 Torpedo-boat destroyers (800)</td>
<td>Torpedo-boat destroyer</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Submarine</td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total displacement: 119,200

1 It is believed that the two Dreadnought battleships were—one of the Konigs class of 25,400 tons, and the other of the Hessen type of 22,500 tons.

The list gives only vessels which were seen to sink or whose loss the Germans admit, and, in addition, it is positively affirmed that one battleship of the Dreadnought type and one battle-cruiser, together with three more destroyers, were so badly injured that they were probably unable to get back to port.

The Seydlitz was a battle-cruiser of 24,610 tons.
II. SIR DAVID BEATTY'S REPORT

_Lion_, 19th June, 1916.

Sir,—I have the honour to report that at 2.37 p.m. on _31st May, 1916_, I was cruising and steering to the northward to join your Flag.

The Light-cruiser Screen was disposed from E. to W.

* At 2.20 p.m. reports were received from _Galatea_ (Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O., A.D.C.) indicating the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately altered to SSE., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base. At 2.35 p.m. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered to the eastward, and subsequently to north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 p.m. Their force consisted of five battle-cruisers.

* After the first reports of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light-cruiser Squadrons changed their direction, and, without waiting for orders, spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the Battle-cruiser Squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the

* Paragraphs prefaced by an asterisk * are incorporated in Admiral Jellicoe's dispatch.